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Monitoring Innovative
Contracting on the 
Malheur National Forest
Did Local Communities Benefit?
Introduction
In 2003, the Malheur National Forest experimented 
with innovative contracting mechanisms to carry out 
fuels reduction work in the Blue Mountains Demonstra-
tion Area (BMDA).  The BMDA was initiated in June 
1999 to test new strategies for accelerating ecosystem 
restoration in the Blue Mountains of Eastern Oregon 
to address the dire need for ecological restoration and 
economic and social risk in nearby communities (BMDA 
Business Plan, 2000). Because these contracts targeted 
fuels in the BMDA, the Forest Service piloted innovative 
contracting mechanisms to stimulate local community 
benefit while simultaneously restoring fire-adapted 
ecosystems.
The Malheur National Forest offered several mul-
tiple-award, three-year indefinite delivery, indefinite 
quaintly (IDIQ) thinning contracts with removal rights 
to reduce fire hazard by reducing fuel ladders and 
excessive down woody fuels.  These were “best value” 
contracts, which considered factors in addition to price 
when awarding the contracts.  Community benefit was 
considered as part of the award selection criteria. Thin-
ning operations were to be performed through a com-
bination of hand and machine thinning, bucking, and 
slash treatments.  The solicitations allowed contractors 
to pile, masticate, or remove thinning byproducts. The 
Forest Service intended for these contracts to provide 
economic opportunities for nearby businesses and resi-
dents while simultaneously reducing fire hazard.
This paper presents the results of interviews with 
eight contractors that were awarded thinning contracts.  
We intended to examine how the contracting mecha-
nisms used in these thinning solicitations affected local 
communities and contractors.  The contractors we inter-
viewed conducted fuels reduction work through 15 task 
orders.  Task orders are requests that direct contractors 
to carry out specific tasks.  Each contractor was given a 
different number of task orders that corresponded to one 
of four contracts.  
Innovative Contract Components
The multiple-award, indefinite-delivery-indefinite 
quantity (IDIQ) component was one innovative element 
used in these fuels reduction contracts.  Traditionally, 
Forest Service contracts were written for a specified 
amount of work to be performed within a certain time 
period in exchange for a specific payment.  Under an 
IDIQ contract, however, the agency solicits a minimum 
and maximum amount of work.  After a contractor is 
awarded a solicitation, the government and the contrac-
tor commit to a minimum amount of work and a con-
tract start and end date.  The government then issues 
separate task orders to request work during that time 
period.  Multiple-award IDIQ contracts operate in the 
same way as standard IDIQs except that they award the 
work to several different contractors based on a single 
solicitation (Moseley, 2002).  In the case of the Malheur 
thinning contracts, each contract designated a minimum 
and maximum quantity of acres to be treated (the IDIQ 
component).  In addition, the work outlined in one 
solicitation was awarded to multiple contractors (the 
multiple award component).  
The removal rights aspect was a second innovative 
element of the Malheur thinning contracts.  Contrac-
tors were not traditionally allowed to remove service 
work byproducts since any byproducts were considered 
government (or public) property.  Recently, however, 
contracts have included provisions for contractors to 
remove restoration byproducts at no charge as long as 
removal does not adversely affect other contract require-
ments or restoration goals.  Contractors on the Malheur 
were granted removal rights, so they were allowed to 
remove slash for subsequent utilization or sale.
Local community benefit was a third innovative 
component of these contracts.  Traditional service con-
tracts often did not meet the needs of rural communities 
since they were frequently inaccessible to small busi-
nesses in rural areas.  In response, the Forest Service has 
begun to experiment with new ways to shape contracts 
so that they contribute to community well being.  In 
the case of the Malheur thinning contracts, applications 
from local businesses that planned to hire local workers 
received higher evaluation ratings and were more likely 
to obtain the work agreement.  Community benefit, in 
other words, was considered as part of the evaluation 
criteria used to award contracts.  
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Monitoring Project
The purpose of this monitoring project was to as-
sess what kind and how much benefit these innovative 
contracting mechanisms provided to local communities.  
The overall purpose of this project was to determine 
how these thinning contracts impacted rural commu-
nity economic well-being.  More specifically, the study 
sought to measure the extent to which the contracts (1) 
created and maintained quality jobs1 and (2) utilized 
byproducts of thinning in local value added process-
ing.  Research questions included:  How many jobs were 
created or maintained?  How long did these jobs last and 
how much were workers paid?  How much material was 
removed?  How much value was added locally?  How 
good a business opportunity were these contracts?
Methods
To answer the research questions, the researchers 
conducted phone interviews with eight contractors from 
December 2003 through January 2004 with the con-
tractors that were awarded these innovative contracts. 
Interviews with contractors lasted approximately 15-20 
minutes and were structured according to a fixed set 
of survey questions.  Interviewees were asked to share 
information about job quality, utilization opportunities, 
and business stability generated through these experi-
mental contract mechanisms.  
Results
Did the thinning contracts create and maintain 
quality jobs in the woods?
The first objective of this study was to measure the 
extent to which the thinning contracts created and main-
tained quality jobs in the woods.  Respondents indicated 
that, through these contracts, a total of 30 employees 
were retained and temporary work opportunities were 
provided for 30 additional people.  Therefore, the thin-
ning contracts provided 60 people with varying amounts 
of work.  The average job duration was 45 crew days per 
contractor, yet employment periods ranged from 4 crew 
days to 173 crew days per contractor.  
The Malheur National Forest is located almost 
entirely within Grant County boundaries, yet most of 
the workers (70%) lived in Harney County.  However, 
ninety-three percent of workers lived within 20 miles of 
the Malheur National Forest border.  Therefore, if “lo-
cal” is defined as an area within 20 miles of the Malheur 
National Forest border, then the thinning contracts re-
sulted in 58 temporary local employment opportunities.  
To further evaluate job quality, we analyzed employ-
ee wages and benefits.  According to the contractors, the 
median wage paid to workers was $16.00/hr.  Reported 
average hourly wages ranged from $11.50/hr to $33.00/
hr.  According to the Oregon Employment Department 
(OED), the 2004 median hourly wage in Grant County 
was $12.81/hr and in Harney County was $10.79/hr 
(Oregon Employment Department 2005).  
At first glance, it seems that the median hourly wage 
paid to contract workers was $3.19 (20%) higher than 
the Grant County median, and $5.21 (33%) higher than 
the Harney County median.  Yet, it is important to note 
that no workers received health insurance or other non-
wage benefits.  Instead of providing benefits, contractors 
paid workers $2.15/hr for self-paid health insurance, 
which is the minimum payment required under the Ser-
vice Contract Act.  When we deducted $2.15/hr from the 
wages reported by contractors, the worker median wage 
became $13.85/hr.  This wage is only $1.04 (8 %) higher 
than the Grant County hourly median and $3.06 (22 %) 
higher than the Harney County hourly median.  
When asked for their perceptions about the con-
tracts as a business opportunity, 67% of the contractors 
interviewed felt these contracts were better business 
opportunities than other Forest Service contracts they 
have received.  The remaining 33% felt the contracts 
offered the same type of business opportunity as other 
Forest Service work.  Although 33% of contractors felt 
the business opportunity was not necessarily better than 
other Forest Service contract mechanisms, 100% of 
respondents felt the innovative contracting mechanisms 
enhanced business stability.  In particular, respondents 
thought these contracts provided them with more con-
sistent work.  Contractors indicated that thinning work 
(as opposed to contract logging) allowed them to stay 
employed for longer periods of time, particularly since 
thinning work can be carried out in the winter when log-
ging operations are closed.  
Fifty percent of the interviewees remarked that the 
best value component, in particular, enhanced busi-
ness stability.  In the words of one respondent, “…a 
conscientious contractor who has a good crew and does 
good work gets some recognition and advantage in bid 
evaluation.”  Respondents further indicated that task 
order size affected business health.  Some contractors 
suggested that small task orders were beneficial because 
they matched small business capacity and enabled them 
to out-compete larger, more distant contractors.  In con-
trast, other respondents reported that larger task orders 
were better business opportunities since they provided 
more work--as long as the Forest Service gave them 
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enough time to complete the work with a small crew.
  
To what extent did the contracts utilize thinning 
by-products in local value-added processing?
The second objective of this study was to evaluate 
the extent to which thinning by-products were utilized 
in local value-added processing.  Contractors reported 
that thinning treatments had been applied to 5,342 
acres, but that material had been removed from only 495 
acres.  In other words, at the time of the interviews, 9% 
of thinned material had been removed and utilized.  Of 
the material that was removed, approximately 9.5 cords 
of white fir was used for firewood.  One truckload of ju-
niper was sold to a specialty/ornamental user, a second 
truckload of juniper was sold as chips, and an unknown 
amount of lodge pole pine was sold to a post and pole 
operation.  Three out of four buyers were located in Har-
ney County.  Therefore, according to our definition of 
“local,” much of the removed material was sold in local 
markets. 
Although half of the of contractors utilized some 
of the thinned material, all respondents said they were 
unable to locate adequate markets.  Only one respondent 
felt that their ability to sell material under these “inno-
vative” contracts was somewhat better than opportuni-
ties under previous contracts.  Eighty-eight percent of 
respondents felt these innovative contracts provided the 
same kind of market opportunity as other, more tradi-
tional contract work.
Contractors were also asked whether or not a list of 
local businesses that was provided with work instruc-
tions helped them locate market opportunities.  Only 
one respondent found this list somewhat useful.  Eighty-
eight percent of contractors found the list “not very 
useful” at best and completely “useless” at worst.  Fifty 
percent of respondents said they found the list useless 
because they already knew all the companies on the list.  
Moreover, a few contractors felt that, because there were 
inadequate markets for utilization, it was not worth their 
time to contact more than the couple of businesses they 
already knew.
Contractors provided several other suggestions on 
ways similar contracting arrangements could be im-
proved in the future.  Contractors indicated that task 
orders should provide adequate time for businesses to 
complete work given small crews, seasonal constraints, 
and other business commitments.  Contractors further 
suggested that more robust descriptions of desired work 
would be helpful.  According to one respondent, “the 
level of difficulty specified on [our] task order was pretty 
good, but only addressed stems per acre, not height of 
trees…[which] makes a huge difference in production 
rate.”  
Respondents also felt that contracts should allow 
them to exercise maximum flexibility in applying re-
moval techniques.  For instance, one contractor indicat-
ed they would like permission to use crushing equip-
ment to dispose of brush.  Another respondent said he 
wished purchasing merchantable timber found in the 
work unit were possible.  Moreover, contractors sug-
gested that use of stewardship contracts could provide 
this needed flexibility.  Stewardship contracts that allow 
contractors to design treatment techniques could give 
them an incentive to invest in equipment, commit to dif-
ferent types of work, and expand their business.
Finally, a couple of respondents expressed disinter-
est in attending contractor workshops.  Interviewees felt 
that workshops were oriented toward new contractors 
and encouraged new marketplace entries.  In addition, 
contractors were reluctant to discuss contracting op-
portunities in front of their competition, particularly in 
front of new competition.
Data Limitations
The results of this study are accompanied by data 
limitations.  First, the small sample size limits the gener-
alizability of our conclusions.  Although we interviewed 
all of the contractors awarded contracts, because there 
were only eight contractors to interview, this study may 
not be representative of what would happen if these 
sort of contracts were adopted systematically. Second, 
because the amount of material removed was reported 
using a variety of different measures, we were unable to 
use a single number to quantify how much material was 
utilized.  Third, the self-reported nature of the data used 
in this study limits the reliability of our results. 
Conclusions
The interviews with contractors suggest that the 
benefits of the IDIQ contracts with removal rights largely 
stayed in the local community. In particular, workers 
were from nearby communities and most of the byprod-
ucts were sold locally. The interviews also suggested 
that these contracts created more benefit than traditional 
service contracts by providing more sustained employ-
ment and through the opportunity to remove small trees. 
The major challenge to providing additional benefits, 
however, was that contractors could not find adequate 
markets for the small trees that they could remove.  The 
resources that the Forest Service provided did not help 
much.  It would appear that a more concerted effort to 
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identify and/or develop markets would be required to 
significantly increase community benefit from small ma-
terial utilization.   Still, most contractors felt that these 
contracts were better opportunities than traditional 
contracts and all contractors thought that these contracts 
increased business stability, compared to traditional 
contracts. The results suggest that all three of the in-
novations used in this experiment—evaluating local 
benefit as part of best value to the government, multiple 
award IDIQs, and removal rights—are worth using again 
in the future. 
Notes
1.  A quality job is one that pays high wages and offers ben-
efits, occurs in a safe and healthy workplace, is durable, offers 
opportunities for advancement and a future, and creates the 
opportunity to work close to home (Moseley, 2004).
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